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Abstract 
This study aim was to examine and analyzing effect of managerial ownership, financial leverage, profitability, 
firm size, and investment opportunity on dividend policy, and effect of all that variables on firm value. 
Populations were all manufacturing companies that go-public and listed at Indonesian Stock Exchange during 
2006-2011 periods and a sample was decided by census method. Research results showed that managerial 
ownership and investment opportunity affect on dividend policy, while financial leverage, profitability, and firm 
size has no effect on dividend policy. These results further explained that research variables, namely managerial 
ownership, financial leverage, profitability, firm size, investment opportunity, and dividend policy affect firm 
value.      
Keywords: : Dividend policy, Firm value, Firm characteristics, Indonesia Stock Exchange 
 
1. Introduction 
Manufacturing industry was one of most develop industries and providing largest contribution to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of Indonesia compared to some other industries. However, manufacturing sector 
growth declined slowly during 2006-2009 (Anonymous, 2011). Phenomenon a contribution decline on GDP 
during 2006-2009 will hinder goal to increase firm value. This was proved from lower firm value during 2006-
2009. In these conditions, firms need to make informed decisions related to various corporate policies, one of 
them was dividend policy. Dividend policy was a policy relating to firm's decision to share income available in 
form of dividends to shareholders or hold it as retained earnings for future investment (Weston and Copeland, 
1992). From manufacturing industry, there were 15 companies committed to distribute dividends for 5 
consecutive years during 2007-2011. Most of 15 companies decided large percentage of retained earnings. This 
shows management decisions making influenced by distribution and growth of company profitable investment 
opportunities. 
Investors invest their funds in firm’s stock to make a profit. Expected profit by investors and prospective 
investors were future shares results namely dividends and capital gains (Wild, Subramanyam, and Halsey, 2004). 
Firm’s commitment to pay dividend should enhance shareholder value. This shows company believes that 
information within dividend can provide a positive signal to investors. 
Research on dividend policy shows different result among researchers (Gordon, 1959; Miller and Modigliani, 
1961; Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979) and then ultimately increases the long series of dividend puzzle 
(Black, 1976). Firm's efforts to enhance firm value were directly or through dividend policy. It requires firm to 
review factors that reflecting firm characteristics and firm performance as consideration for investors and 
prospective investors to invest in stocks. 
Theoretically, several factors of firm characteristics can affect corporate dividend policy and firm value, both 
directly and indirectly. They were managerial ownership, financial leverage, profitability, firm size, and 
investment opportunity (Weston and Copeland, 1992; Chen and Steiner, 1999, 2000; Iturriaga and Sanz, 2001; 
Brigham and Houston, 2004; Al-Najjar, 2009; Al-Shubiri, 2011). This study purpose was to examine and 
analyzing effect of managerial ownership, financial leverage, profitability, firm size, and investment opportunity 
on dividend policy, also to test and analyzing effect of five variables and dividend policy on firm’s value listed 
on Indonesian Stock Exchange. 
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2. Theory Review, Hypothesis, and Conceptual Model 
2.1 Relationship of Managerial Ownership, Dividend Policy, and Firm Value 
Managerial ownership was result of firm's efforts realization to reduce agency problem. It will reduces manager 
chance to act adversely and detrimental to shareholders interests. According to Keown et al. (2005), dividends 
payment was not direct result of monitoring process that closer to investment management. Rozeff (1982) found 
high dividends payment reduce conflicts between managers and shareholders. Thus, the higher managerial 
ownership, the lower corporate dividend policy (Allie et al., 1993; Mollah, 2011). 
H1a:  Managerial ownership negatively affect on dividend policy of manufacturing companies at Indonesia 
Stock Exchange 
Firm's efforts to reduce agency problems by monitoring mechanisms through managerial ownership and 
dividend policies can indirectly increase firm value . That was because managerial ownership creates alignment 
between managers and shareholders interests. Manager will seek to increase firm value that reflected firm’s stock 
price (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, the managerial ownership can increase firm value (McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990; Chen et al., 2003). 
H2a:  Managerial ownership has a positive effect on firm value of manufacturing companies at Indonesia Stock 
Exchange 
 
2.2 Relationship of Financial Leverage, Dividend Policy, and Firm Value 
Firm's efforts to reduce agency conflicts between managers and shareholders by dividends payment can create 
conflict between shareholders or managers with lender. That was because by increasing dividend payout, the 
higher company chances to use external funding (Chrutchley and Hansen, 1989). Relationship between financial 
leverage with dividends policy arises from restrictive debt covenants (including restrictions of dividends 
payment) of creditor to protect its interests. (Taranto, 2002). Thus, the higher company's financial leverage, the 
lower companies dividend policy (Jensen et al., 1992). 
H1b:  Financial leverage negatively affect on dividend policy of manufacturing companies at Indonesia Stock 
Exchange 
Financial leverage can be used as firm monitoring tool to lower agency problems. This can increase firm value 
because agency problems can become a barrier to increase its firm value (Jensen, 1986; Rao, 1995:35). In 
addition to monitoring mechanism, financial leverage can increase firm value through tax deductible (Modigliani 
and Miller, 1963) and also signaling (Fama and French, 1998). Thus, increasing financial leverage at an optimal 
point it will increase firm value (Davies et al., 2005; Mak and Kusnadi, 2005). 
H2b:  Financial leverage has a positive effect on firm value of manufacturing companies at Indonesia Stock 
Exchange 
 
2.3 Relationship of Profitability, Dividend Policy, and Firm Value 
Dividends were part of company net income that distributed to shareholders. The higher profitability, the higher 
firm cash flow, and firm were expected to pay higher dividends (Jensen et al., 1992, Chang, 2009; Abor and 
Bokpin, 2010). 
H1c:  Profitability has a positive effect on dividend policy of manufacturing companies at Indonesia Stock 
Exchange 
Optimal dividend payments can be seen as a profitability signal in future (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 
1985). Firms that able to generate stable and increasing profits can be seen as a positive signal by investors 
related to firm performance, so that a positive response will increase firm value . Thus, higher profitability can 
increase firm value (Chen and Steiner, 2000; Iturriaga and Sanz, 2001). 
H2c:  Profitability has a positive effect on firm value of manufacturing companies at Indonesia Stock Exchange 
 
2.4 Relationship of Firm Size, Dividend Policy, and Firm Value 
Firm size affects on corporate dividend policy. Firm size will determine achievement of profitability and stability, 
easier access to capital markets, and smaller transaction costs when compared to small and new companies 
(Weston and Copeland, 1992). Large companies tend to rate higher dividends than smaller and new companies. 
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Lloyd et al. (1985) shows that firm size plays a role to explain dividend payout ratio of company. Easy access to 
various external funding, profitability and stability were records that owned by large corporations. Positive 
response from investors can increase firm value (Suranta and Midiastuty, 2003). 
H1d:  Firm size has a positive effect on dividend policy of manufacturing companies at Indonesia Stock 
Exchange 
H2d:  Firm size has a positive effect on firm value of manufacturing companies at Indonesia Stock Exchange 
 
2.5 Relationship of Investment Opportunity, Dividend Policy, and Firm Value 
Investment opportunities were an investment decision from combination of assets in place and options on future 
investment in projects that provide a positive net present value, and may affect firm value (Myers, 1977). 
Related to dividend policy, a firm that has a lot of profitable investment opportunities tends to decide low 
dividend payout ratio target, and vice versa (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Langsen, 1988; Brigham and Houston, 
2004). 
H1e:   Investment opportunity has a negative effect on dividend policy of manufacturing companies at Indonesia 
Stock Exchange 
According to Fama (1978), firm value solely influenced by investment opportunities. Myers (1977) describes 
investment opportunities to firm goals achievement. Firms with large investment opportunities shows that firm 
has a bright future prospect. They will have positive influence on firm's stock price. Thus, the higher investment 
opportunities, the higher firm value (Iturriaga and Sanz, 2001; Davies et al., 2005). 
H2e:  Investment opportunity has a positive effect on firm value of manufacturing companies at Indonesia Stock 
Exchange 
 
2.6 Relationship of Dividend Policy and Firm Value 
Most companies that committed to distribute dividends to shareholders will believe that dividend policy can 
affect value of firm's stock price. That was because dividend reflects firm's prospects to get profit in future. 
Dividend policy was expected to gives  a positive signal regarding to firm condition. Thus, dividend policy can 
increase firm value (Baker et al., 1985; Baker and Powell, 1999; Suranta and Machfoedz, 2003; Omran and 
Pointon, 2004; Dasilas et al., 2009, Mai, 2010). 
H3:  Dividend policy has a positive effect on firm value of manufacturing companies at Indonesia Stock 
Exchange 
Based description above, conceptual model of study can be described as follows. 
                  
Figure 1: Research Model 
 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1 Data 
This research was explanatory with quantitative approach. It uses secondary data from manufacturing company 
that go-public at Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) and Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD). Secondary 
data used were annual financial statements issued by company from 2006-2011 periods. 
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3.2 Population and Sample 
These study populations were manufacturing company listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during 2006-
2011 periods. This was census research or saturated sampling. All members of population become sampled 
because population was relatively small. Amount saturated samples obtained were 15 manufacturing companies. 
3.3 Research Variables and Measurement 
This research use endogenous and exogenous variables. Endogenous variable were dividend policy variables (Y1) 
and firm value (Y2). Meanwhile, five exogenous variables were managerial ownership (X1), financial leverage 
(X2), profitability (X3), firm size (X4), and investment opportunity (X5). Here was operational definition of 
each variable used in the study. 
3.3.1 Endogenous Variables 
a. Firm Value  
Firm value was value of a business entity to generate profits in future that reflected at market value. Firm value 
as measured by Tobin's q can be formulated as follows (Chung and Pruitt, 1994; Rose, 2005; Benson and 
Davidson III, 2009): 
Tobin's Q = (Market value of equity + Book value of equity): Book value of assets 
b. Dividend policy 
Dividend policy was a policy-making related to net income allocation that derived from company operating 
activities to be distributed in form of dividends to shareholders or were held as retained earnings. Dividend 
policy as measured by dividend payout ratio (DPR) can be formulated as follows (Al-Najjar, 2009). 
DPRit = Dividend per share it: Earning per share it 
3.3.2 Exogenous Variables 
a. Managerial ownership 
Managerial ownership describes shares ownership by company's management. Managerial ownership (Mown) 
can be formulated as follows (Chrutchley and Hansen, 1989; Handoko, 2002): 
Mown = Number of shares owned by commissioners and directors: Total common shares outstanding 
b. Financial leverage 
Financial leverage was firm’s ability to use fixed financial obligations in order to maximize profit changes on per 
share income of common stock. Financial leverage measured by debt to total assets ratio, i.e. ratio that measures 
the extent assets company has been financed by debt. Debt to total assets ratio can be formulated as follows 
(Aivazian et al., 2003; Al-Najjar, 2009; Al-Shubiri, 2011): 
DAR = Total debt: Total assets 
c. Profitability 
Profitability was a management effectiveness measurement based on returns from sales and investment. 
Profitability was measured by return on assets which reflects firm's ability to use assets resources to generate 
profits. Return on assets can be formulated as follows (Chen and Steiner, 1999; Abor and Bokpin, 2010; Mehta, 
2012): 
ROA = Net income: Total assets 
d. Firm size 
Firm size was a level to shows a firm development within business. Firm size can be formulated as follows (Al-
Najjar, 2009; Al-Shubiri, 2011): 
Firm size = Ln total assets 
e. Investment opportunity 
Investment opportunity was an investment decision in form of a combination of assets in place and future 
investment options in a profitable project. Investment opportunity was measured by capital expenditure to total 
assets (CAPX / A) that can be formulated as follows (Allie et al., 1993; Iturriaga and Sanz, 2001; Saputro, 2003; 
Chang, 2009): 
CAPX / A = (book value of fixed assets t + book value of fixed assets t-1): Total assets 
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3.4 Data Analysis Method 
Based on research objectives, conceptual framework and research hypotheses, it appears that relationship 
between whole variables of this research suggests a causal and recursive relationship. Therefore, analytical 
technique used was path analysis. Data were analyzed by SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences). 
Research problems that analyzed by path analysis can be a structural model with two step function equations that 
can be formulated as follows: 
Model 1 
Dividen it = ρ1 Managerial it + ρ3 Leverage it + ρ5 Profitability it + ρ7 Size it + ρ9 Investment it + ε1  
Model 2 
Firm value it = ρ2 Managerial it + ρ4 Leverage it + ρ6 Profitability it + ρ8 Size it + ρ10 Investment it + ρ 11 
Dividen it + ε2 
Description:  ρ it = Standardized coefficient or path coefficients 
 
4. Result and Discussion 
4.1 Hypothesis Testing 
• Hypothesis Testing for First Model 
Based on hypothesis testing for first equation model, path coefficient analysis was follows: 
Dividen = -0,244 Managerial – 0,092 Leverage + 0,200 Profitability + 0,125 Size – 0,223 Investment 
• Hypothesis Testing for Second Model 
Based on hypothesis testing for second equation model, path coefficient analysis was follows: 
Firm Value = 0,130 Managerial + 0,124 Leverage + 0,854 Profitability + 0,161 Size + 0,174 Investment + 0,133 
Dividen 
Table 1 presented result summary the hypothesis testing of direct relationships. 
Table 1. Hypothesis Testing Results 
Description Coeff. Sig. Description 
Managerial ownership (X1) Dividend policy (Y1) -0,244*) 0,046 Hypothesis (H1a) accepted 
Financial leverage (X2) Dividend policy (Y1) -0,092 0,403 Hypothesis (H1b) rejected 
Profitability (X3) Dividend policy (Y1) 0,200 0,082 Hypothesis (H1c) rejected 
Firm size (X4) Dividend policy (Y1) 0,125 0,292 Hypothesis (H1d) rejected 
Investment opportunity (X5) Dividend policy (Y1) -0,223*) 0,048 Hypothesis (H1e) accepted 
Managerial ownership (X1) Firm value (Y2) 0,130*) 0,011 Hypothesis (H2a) accepted 
Financial leverage (X2) Firm value (Y2) 0,124*) 0,007 Hypothesis (H2b) accepted 
Profitability (X3) Firm value (Y2) 0,854*) 0,000 Hypothesis (H2c) accepted 
Firm size (X4) Firm value (Y2) 0,161*) 0,001 Hypothesis (H2d) accepted 
Investment opportunity (X5) Firm value (Y2) 0,174*) 0,000 Hypothesis (H2e) accepted 
Dividend policy (Y1) Firm value (Y2) 0,133*) 0,008 Hypothesis (H3) accepted 
Description: *) Significant at alpha 5% 
 
4.2 Discussion 
Table 1 shows significance of results that obtained for each variable relationships or hypotheses. These results 
can be described as follows. 
4.2.1 Effect of Managerial Ownership on Dividend Policy and Firm Value 
• H1a: Managerial ownership has a negative effect on dividend policy 
Table 1 shows significance of managerial ownership on dividend policy was 0,046 or less than 0.05, and 
coefficient of -0.244. These results show that managerial ownership has negative effect on dividend policy, 
therefore, hypothesis 1a was accepted. 
The higher managerial ownership, management will distribute greater profits as dividends to shareholders. This 
was because value of retained earnings and dividend payout related to executive compensation. Bhattacharyya et 
al. (2008) stated that retained earnings were positively related to executive compensation, while dividend payout 
was negatively related to executive compensation. This results support Jensen et al. (1992), Allie et al. (1993), 
Chen and Steiner (1999), and Mollah (2011) which states that higher managerial ownership will decrease agency 
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problems, and also lowering firm's dependence to dividend as monitoring mechanism. 
• H2a: Managerial ownership has a positive effect on firm value 
Table 1 shows the managerial ownership significance on firm value was 0.011 or less than 0.05, and coefficient 
of 0.130. These results show that managerial ownership has a positive effect on firm value, therefore, hypothesis 
2a was accepted. 
Agency theory underlies relationship between managerial ownership and firm value, where agency problem will 
inhibit firm to achieve goal to maximize firm value (Rao, 1995). These results showed that managerial 
ownership has a positive effect on firm value. This supports the role of management stock ownership to align 
interests between management and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
This study result support McConnell and Servaes (1990), Chen and Steiner (1999), Chen et al. (2003) that 
managerial ownership has a positive effect on firm value. In addition, this results also were consistent with 
Morck et al. (1988), Chen and Steiner (2000), Iturriaga and Sanz (2001), Davies et al. (2005), and Hamin (2005) 
which suggested a non-monotonic relationship between managerial ownership and firm value, where at a certain 
level of management ownership, managerial ownership can increase firm value and also lowers firm value . 
Based on data from 2006-2010, managerial ownership was under 5%, and manufacturing company managed to 
increase its value. 
4.2.2 Effect of Financial Leverage on Dividend Policy and Firm Value 
• H1b: Financial leverage has a negative effect on dividend policy 
Table 1 shows financial leverage significance on policy dividend was 0.403 or more than 0.05, and coefficient of 
-0.092. This results show that financial leverage has no effect on dividend policy, therefore, hypothesis 1b was 
rejected. 
Financial leverage relationships with dividend policy was based on agency theory, where firm's efforts to 
minimize agency problems can be done with a bonding mechanism that increasing debt amount or increasing 
dividends (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, financial leverage has no effect on dividend policy. It suggests 
that firm does not use bonding mechanism to reduce agency problem. Financial constraints did not affect 
corporate dividend decisions. That was because firm can continues to distribute dividends if future dividends 
was paid from profits that earned after signing of loan agreement, and net working capital was not under a pre-
determined amount (Weston and Copeland, 1992). This finding does not support agency theory underlying 
relationships in financial leverage and dividend policies (Jensen et al., 1992, Al-Najjar, 2009, and Al-Shubiri, 
2011). Adversely, these results were consistent with Aivazian et al. (2003) which states that financial leverage 
does not affect dividend policy of firm. 
• H2b: Financial leverage has a positive effect on firm value 
Table 1 shows financial leverage significance on firm value was 0.007 or less than 0.05, and coefficient of 0.124. 
This results show that financial leverage has a positive effect on firm value, therefore, hypothesis 2b was 
accepted. 
Financial leverage can become external monitoring tool in effort to achieve firm's goal to maximize firm value 
by reducing managers opportunity to act contrary to shareholders interests (Jensen, 1986). Besides as a 
monitoring tool, financial leverage may also provide a signal about firm's performance (Myers, 1977; Ross, 1977) 
and a tax deductible (Miller and Modigliani, 1963). During period of high investment growth, in addition to use 
internal funding, firm also use external funding in form of debt. This was done to improve monitoring activities 
to prevent managers use excess cash of firm (free cash flow) on activities that do not add value to firm or to 
invest excess cash in less profitable investment. These findings support Mak and Kusnadi (2005) and Davies et 
al. (2005) who stated financial leverage (debt to total assets) may be used to increase firm's value 
4.2.3 Effect of Profitability on Dividend Policy and Firm Value 
• H1c: Profitability has a positive effect on dividend policy 
Table 1 shows profitability significance on dividend policy was 0,082 or bigger than 0.05, and coefficient of 
0.200. These results show that profitability does not affect dividend policy, therefore, hypothesis 1c was rejected. 
Profitability level using return on assets (ROA) measurements shows firm's ability to utilize its assets sources 
efficiently to generate profits. Based on signaling theory, firms that obtain high profitability will tend to 
distribute a greater share of profits in form of dividends to shareholders (Al-Najjar, 2009; Al-Shubiri, 2011). 
However, profitability level did not affect on dividend policy during 2006-2010 due value retained earnings of 
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manufacturing companies tend to increase every year. These conditions show that firms prefer to keep most of 
profits rather than increasing its dividend when firm has higher profit. 
Higher retained earnings show that firm prioritizes funding needs from internal financing through retained 
earnings. These findings support the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984). This finding supports Chen 
and Steiner (1999) and Mehta (2012), which states the level of profitability does not affect dividend policy. 
These results do not support the signaling theory underlying the relationship of profitability and dividend policy. 
• H2c: Profitability has a positive effect on firm value 
Table 1 shows profitability significance on firm value was 0.000 or less than 0.05, and coefficient of 0.854. This 
results show that profitability has a positive effect on firm value, therefore, hypothesis 2c was accepted. 
Relationship between profitability and firm value was based on signaling theory, if firm can generate stable and 
higher profits, then it was seen as a positive signal by investors related to firm performance . These results 
showed a positive effect of profitability on firm value. This finding supports Chen and Steiner (2000) and 
Iturriaga and Sanz (2001) which states higher profitability (return on assets) can increase firm value. This results 
support the signaling theory underlying relationship between profitability and firm value. 
4.2.4 Effect of Firm Size on Dividend Policy and Firm Value 
• H1d: Firm size has a positive effect on dividend policy 
Table 1 shows firm size significance on dividend policy was 0.292 or bigger than 0.05, and coefficient of 0.125. 
This results show that firm size does not affect on dividend policy, therefore, hypothesis 1d was rejected. 
Relationship between firm size and dividend policy was based on transactional cost theory. Transactional costs 
arise as a result of firm's efforts to reduce agency problem through dividend policy. Agency cost can be reduced, 
but firm's efforts to minimize agency cost can increase flotation costs (Rozeff, 1982; Lloyd et al., 1985). The 
trade-off between agency cost and flotation cost eventually became basis of relationship between firm size and 
dividend policy. However, quite a high level of debt makes firm to have easy access to external financing but 
may not necessarily increase dividend policy to shareholders, so firm's size does not affect dividend policy. Most 
of manufacturing firms have debt levels above 30 percent, which makes firm more cautious in making decisions 
related to external funding. This shows that firm has with high debt level will be more susceptible to financial 
distress. Even if a firm has easy access to external financing, firm can not take risk. It supports research of Allie 
et al. (1993) which states that firm's size does not affect dividend policy. Thus, transaction cost theory that 
underlies relationship between firm size and dividend policy has not been proven. 
• H2D: Firm size has a positive effect on firm value 
Table 1 shows firm size significance on firm value was 0.001 or less than 0.05, and coefficient of 0.161. This 
results show that firm size has a positive effect on firm value, therefore, hypothesis 2d was accepted. 
The larger firm, the higher firm value. Theoretically, it was based on ease access of large firms to get external 
funding. Transaction costs incurred will be less when compared to small firms (Al-Malkawi, 2008; Al-Najjar, 
2009; Mollah, 2011). Moreover, large firms tend to attract attention and spotlight. Firms will be encouraged to 
apply good structures and mechanisms in firm management. Based on research results, firm size has a positive 
effect on firm value. This results support Suranta and Midiastuty (2003) which showed a positive relationship 
between firm size and firm value. 
4.2.5 Effect of Investment Opportunity on Dividend Policy and Firm Value 
• H1e: Investment opportunity negatively affect on dividend policy 
Table 1 shows investment opportunity significance to dividend policy was 0.048 or less than 0.05, and 
coefficient of -0.223. These results show that investment opportunity negatively affect dividend policy, therefore, 
hypothesis 1e was accepted. 
Pecking order theory underlies relationship investment opportunity and dividend policy. High investments 
opportunities make firms prefer to withhold income or reduce the distribution of dividends to shareholders 
(Adelegan, 2002). This shows external financing more expensive than internal financing (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). This results show that compared with external financing usage, company prefers to fund its investment 
activities largely with internal funding. This study results support Allie et al. (1993) and Chang (2009) which 
states that high profitable investment opportunity makes firms choose not to pay dividends or decrease dividends 
that distributed to shareholders. Thus, the pecking order theory underlying the relationship between investment 
opportunity and dividend policy was proven. 
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• H2e: Investment opportunity positively affects on firm value 
Table 1 shows investment opportunity significance on firm value was 0.000 or less than 0.05, and coefficient of 
0.174. These results show that investment opportunity has a positive effect on firm value, therefore, hypothesis 
2e was accepted. 
Investment opportunities were one indication a firm still exists in competition between firms within the industry. 
Investment was a very important decision for firm because it was directly related to firm objectives achievement 
to maximize firm value (Myers, 1977; Fama, 1978) . Results show investment opportunity (capital expenditure 
to total assets) has a positive effect on firm value. This shows consideration of investment opportunity quality in 
capital expenditure decisions making could determine stock price reactions (Chung et al, 1998). This finding 
supports Iturriaga and Sanz (2001) and Davies et al. (2005) that higher investment opportunity enhances 
shareholder value. Thus, signaling theory that underlying relationship between investment opportunity and firm 
value was proven. 
4.2.6 Effect of Dividend Policy on Firm Value 
• H3: Dividend policy has a positive effect on firm value 
Table 1 shows dividend policy significance on firm's value of 0.008 or less than 0.05, and coefficient of 0.133. 
These results showed that of dividend policy has positive effect on firm value. 
A relationship between dividend policy and firm value was based on information asymmetry. Investor does not 
have all information that owned by management. Any policy that made may reflect information about condition 
and company performance (Miller and Rock, 1985). The study's findings show signal of cash flows and future 
earnings prospects was contained in dividend policy information that causes firm value  increases. This study 
result support Baker and Powell (1999), Suranta and Machfoedz (2003), Omran and Pointon (2004) that 
dividend policy has a positive effect on firm value. Thus, signaling theory arising from existence of information 
asymmetry between investors and management related to dividend policy was proved. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study considers several factors that could influence decision making of dividend policy and affecting firm's 
efforts to maximize firm value in manufacturing companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange. These factors 
were managerial ownership, financial leverage, profitability, firm size, and investment opportunity. 
Managerial ownership and investment opportunity negatively affect on dividend policy. Meanwhile, financial 
leverage, profitability, and firm size did not affect on dividend policy. This shows that manufacturing companies 
listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange use internal funding as a major funding to finance operations and investment 
activities. In addition, firm makes efforts to minimize agency problems, this result showed that manufacturing 
companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange was more like internal monitoring mechanism through 
compensation provision of stock ownership by management rather than bonding mechanism or by increasing 
company's debt. 
Managerial ownership, financial leverage, profitability, firm size, investment opportunity, and dividend policy 
has a positive effect on firm value. This shows that increase or decrease in value of managerial ownership, 
financial leverage, profitability, firm size, investment opportunity, and dividend policy can changes firm value of 
manufacturing companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
This study result provides implications and contributions to business practice, including manufacturing 
companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange. They committed to payout dividend policy, to consider stability 
of its dividend payment policy. Corporate dividend policy brings information about firm's prospects for profit 
growth in future. Such information may invite a response from investors, so that will affect firm value. In 
addition, investors and prospective investors, when investing in a company, especially a company that was 
committed in dividends, consider rightly information regarding share ownership by management (managerial 
ownership), debt policy, profitability, firm size, and  investment opportunities, because these all factors 
determine whether firm value increases or not. Further research can be done on a wider industrial sector so that 
research results can be generalized, and be done on latest research period. In addition, insignificant research 
results can be revisited, because there were inconsistent results among researchers. 
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